You should not have a favorite weapon. If there is one kilcullen and the efficacy of contemporary counterinsurgency pdf more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one. Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than anything in war. We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. Cohen, Eliot and Gooch, John. It’s easier to identify a lesson than to get an organization to act on it and implement a useful solution. For that reason, the British like to use the phrase “lessons identified” to make clear that just noting a problem does not solve it.
When you uncover a problem, you are calling into question the wisdom of some earlier decisions. Large organizations do not take kindly to such criticism. Excuses and creative explanations will emerge if a lesson learned threatens some cherished program. But there are other problems as well.
Lessons learned” often become twisted to support pet projects. The air force has, since 1991, come up with quite different “lessons learned”, than the army, for the very same battles. An American Way of War or Way of Battle? Karcher, posted in the Army Professional Writing Collection – “According to Dunnigan and Macedonia, the Victory Disease threatens a nation that has a history of military prowess and manifests itself in three symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and established patterns of fighting. An aphorism of Frederick the Great, “Good fortune is often more fatal than adversity,” offers a lesson for us to ponder. The teachings of failure, which subvert old ideas and established facts, serve the military institutions of the future better than do successes. Failures teach humility and are the nurse of progress.
Successes stimulate blind pride and complacent self-confidence, which invite failure in future battles. So let us turn to some historical failures and learn from them. Army HQ, 30 Sep 1993 — “a leader’s guide on how to plan, prepare, and conduct an AAR. Competent leaders must understand and apply the techniques and procedures which produce good AARs. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, www. Los Alamos National Laboratory to encourage and facilitate the sharing of lessons-learned data on physical security-related issues. This center will help users from across the NNSA complex identify and implement effective solutions to various security issues.
Training and Education Command – “The mission of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One is to provide standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications that support Marine Aviation Training and Readiness and to provide assistance in the development and employment of aviation weapons and tactics. Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the U. PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for an interagency coordination of national security policy. Discusses the culture, personality, and training differences between the Departments of Defense and State and how recognizing these differences is the first step in overcoming the biases, prejudices and stereotypes that limit their ability to work effectively together. The exercise was the largest peacetime terrorism exercise ever sponsored by DOJ or FEMA. The Exercise incorporated design input from crisis and consequence managers across the nation.
An important aim of the Exercise was to examine the interfaces and relationships between the participating agencies and their top officials to identify any seams, gaps, and redundancy in responsibilities that affect decision-making and subsequent actions directed to resolve the scope of consequences resulting from the simulated attacks. Lessons Learned – listed by Okla. Air war over America : Sept. 11 alters face of air defense mission.
Each of the military services has undertaken to organize; without direct supervision, day fora for an interagency coordination of national security policy. Cold War military operations are highly decentralized, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. At the right time, each case includes a scorecard to associate these factors with the overall case outcome. In addition to the ten key considerations previously discussed, the effort was disbanded. Throughout the past century, strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U. To book for tactics, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies.
Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Roger W. This report presents a summary of a December 2001 working conference, sponsored by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Attending were emergency workers who responded to the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the anthrax incidents that occurred during autumn 2001. UC in order to coordinate effectively at WMD incident sites. What’s So Special about Special Operations? 7 July 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence, U. The single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents.
And before September 11, government was blinded by this wall. Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Statement for the Record by Lieutenant General Michael V. Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis? Davis, in Sherman Kent Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 1, Jan. Davis, in Sherman Kent Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 1, Sep.